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by lan Mansfield, Operations Director, and Eric 
M. Filippino, Head, Socio-Economic Unit, GICHD 
including communication and medical back-up, and are organized to 
operate as a ream. Local military forces may have rhc necessary equ ip-
ment for demin ing, bur if not, this can be provided by visiting forces 
bilaterally or multilaterally. 
Thus, in many contexts, military forces have been widely 
used in mine action, including humanitarian demining, although with 
varying degrees of success. In Nicaragua, for instance, all demining has 
been carried ou t by the Nicaraguan army and its effectiveness has been 
greatly enhanced by support from visiting milirary forces operating 
under rhe auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). On 
the other hand, in Bosnia Herzegovina, the usc of entity armed forces 
(EAF) in demining has been expensive and demining accidems have 
been unacceptably high in rhe initial phases when compared to com-
mercial companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) . In 
Cambodia, the armed forces have made a relatively limired contribu-
tion to humani tarian demining ro dare, rhough rhe srudy recommends 
that their role and contribution be reviewed. This is due to the recenr 
improvements in organization, training and equi pment of the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), as well as rhc declining donor 
funds for rhc civilian mine action structures in-country. 
M ilitaty forces often operate in environments where info r-
mation is restricted and con trolled, and rhey may be reluctant ro pro-
vide data and information to others. T his makes coordination diffi-
cult, if nor impossible, and duplication and gaps likely. In many con-
texts, local military forces are reluctant to accept coord ination or 
instruction from a civilian aurhoriry. For example, this appears to be 
the case in C ambodia. In Lebanon, the militaty has seemed reluctant 
to take external advice on mine action, although in fo rmation sharing 
has reportedly improved. Similarly, in N icaragua, after early difficul-
ties, coordinarion with rhe National Demining Commission and vis-
piles of mines requires logistic support, such as inventory control, trans-
port and unpacking prior to destruction. The local military can under-
take these labour-intensive tasks. 
Visiting Military Forces 
M any armed forces possess considerable expertise m mine 
action, including managing and overseeing demining and explosive ord-
nance disposal (EOD) programmes, especially in emergency siruarions. 
T he positive elements they may bring are experience, knowledge of tech-
niques and advanced EOD skills, and in a number of cases, some knowl-
edge of the International Mine Action Standards (!MAS). A number of 
the case studies in the GICHD report, notably Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
N icaragua , show that demining accidents have been reduced due ro 
training and oversight from visiting military forces. 
However, in mine-affected countries where rherc is both local 
miliraty and civilian involvement in the mine action processes, visiting 
mil itary forces tend ro view their mission as fulfilling a rather narrow 
service. Cooperation and coordination with civilian structures are nor 
always accorded adequate priority, which can lead to compartmentaliza-
tion of rhe assets being delivered. Certain missions may even be under-
taken withour any direct knowledge of rhe civili an organ izations operat-
ing in the same tl1eatre. 
Bilateral arrangements between militaries can be appropriate 
when the local military is largely or entirely in charge of a country's mine 
action programme. Such agreements, however, may not provide an ade-
quate planning and programming framework when there arc multiple 
local and international actors involved, as programming complexity 
increases geometrically as the number of actors increases. As an example, 
it is possible that a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) or a UN 
Mine Action Centre (MAC) may be working in conf ormity with local-
iting military forces seems ro 
have sign ificantly improved. 
The srudy did not 
find much evidence of the usc 
of the military in the other 
areas of mine action. While 
the military may be able to 
provide warnings about the 
technical dangers of land-
mines and UXO, they are not 
suited to undertake commu-
nity-based MRE pro-
grammes, where social issues 
and helping to develop alter-
native coping mechanisms are 
important. In a few cases, the 
local military may have pro-
vided immediate medical care 
Clearing mines for humanitarian purposes demands 
specific expertise, which may not necessarily be gained as a 
result of ordinary military training or experience. Also, morale 
among deminers serving in local military forces may be low, 
depending on salary and conditions, and conscripts do not 
make the best deminers. It should not be forgotten that mili-
tary deminers are first and foremost soldiers and as such will 
be used as combat engineers if hostilities re-emerge. In the 
aftennath of an internal anned conflict, the national anny 
may not be perceived as neutral and may not be 
ly adapted standard s, bur a 
visiting military fo rce may be 
training on a different inter-
pretation. The !MAS repre-
sent an international set of 
standards char may be adapt-
ed and interpreted differcnrly 
by each host country, making 
no two countries' technical 
procedures or standard oper-
ating procedures (SOPs) 
exactly ali ke. Often , such dis-
parities will become evident 
only !are in rhe programme 
cycle as an increasing amount 
of operatio nal respo nsibility 
is assumed by the national 
authority. The implications 
of this may involve duplica-
tion, unnecessary cost or the 
need to re-clear land. Again, 
welcomed by affected communities. In these situations, it is 
better not to use the military or assign them tasks that do not 
to a civilian mine victim, 
though they d o nor become 
involved in the provision of 
bring them into contact with a community, such as the clear-
ance of military barracks or airfields. 
prosthetics or rehab ilitation activities. Very few militaries anywhere in 
the world have played an active role in calling for a ban on AP land-
mines. T he one other area where the local military has been seen to 
play a significant role is in stockpile destruction in those countries that 
have signed the AP Mine Ban Convention (MBC). Destroying stock-
rhe need for a strong, central national coordination body establ ished 
early in the life of a programme is seen as impon ant in avoiding these 
situations. 
UN peacekeepers have rarely engaged in large-scale humani-
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Thus, although UN peacekeepers have been present in Lebanon for 
more than rwo decades, they have rypically conducted only mine clear-
ance co support their own operations, and according co their own 
national military procedures. Though this may be consistenr wirh the 
obligations of parties ro a conflict under international law ro be 
responsible for mines, booby-uaps and other explosive devices laid by 
those parties, it docs not necessarily lead to substantial remediation of 
the problem in humanitarian terms. In fact, throughout the more than 
20-year experience in Lebanon of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), as seemingly simple a task as the handover of records, con-
cerning the mine clearance work between incoming and outgoing con-
tingents, appears not co have been accomplished. 
Use of Military TAs 
Visiting militaries have often assigned military personnel ro 
serve as TAs to the various MACs and project implementation units. 
Many of these have performed admirably, and the secondmenr of 
active military personnel appears to have been a successful strategy for 
getting a mine action programme up and running in an emergency 
phase and in highly specialized roles, such as EOD. 
However, the GICHD smdy has concluded that the overall 
contribution of these secondmenr programmes has proven modest in 
the long term. There have also been criticisms of the role played by 
some TAs, on the basis of unclear chains of command and reporting 
lines and confused terms of reference. It has also been claimed that 
coordinating authorities have sometimes failed to exploit fully their 
skills and potential contributions ro the programme. Thus, a number 
of rhc case studies in the GIC HD report, while acknowledging an 
important role for in-kind military advisers at the o utset of a mine 
action programme, express concern about their conrriburion over rhe 
longrerm in a development context. This is the case in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Cambodia in particular, where TAs may not neces-
sarily have been equipped with the skills needed to sustain mine 
action. Nor are TAs necessarily experienced in building local capaci-
ties through advising their local counterparts. 
In 1999, in Cambodia, for instance, the Cambodian Mine 
Action Centre (CMAC) hosred 76 TAs, both military and civilian. A 
review by UN Development Program (UNDP) concluded that, "while 
the military has made an impressive contribution in developing capacity 
within the CMAC, partimlarly technical capacity, in gmeral milif<lry advisers 
are less suited to meet the training needs and capr1ciry demands CMAC now 
foces. " Indeed, TAs may end up learning more abom mine action than 
do their national counterparts. These difficulties are compounded by 
tours of dury-rypically six months-that are often roo short for the 
individuals to make an effective contribution to the programme. 
TAs can represent a significantly high cost for a mine action 
programme. The incremental costs associated with any foreign dury 
assignment of personnel from visiting military forces may be at least as 
high as the full cost of engaging equally well-qualified civilian person-
nel for the same assignment. In addition, a different framework for 
employment would allow for the termination of the assignment of an 
employee whose performance proved to be unsatisfactory-something 
that cannot readily be done with personnel seconded on a temporary 
basis from a visiting military force. 
Enhancing Combat Capacity 
The provision of assistance to local miliraty forces for mine 
action purposes, in the form of training and/or equipment, has some-
times been controversial as these can also enhance combat capaciry. 
The nation providing military assistance must carefully consider the 
potential ramifications of supplying training or equipment ro a mili-
raty force. The historical evolution of the conflict, rhe current peace 
and reconciliation developments as well as the nature of the militaty 
structure and deployment must all be weighed against the potential 
benefits of military support for mine action prior to rhe provision of 
assistance. There is no real mechanism ro decide this, as most military-
to-military assistance is provided on a bilateral basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The GICHD study on the role of the military in mine 
acrion found rhat the military has played a significant role in a num-
ber of national mine action programmes. This can be either through 
involvement by the local military forces or wirh support from a visit-
ing milirary force. Invariably, at rhe end of a conAicr, local militaries 
will need training and equipment to enable them to undertake 
humanitarian demining tasks according to international standards. 
T he decision to provide such support will need to be carefully weighed 
against the risk of enhancing their war-fighting capabili ties, and what 
phase of the post-conflict period it is. The study was unable to deter-
mine if it was cheaper to use the militaty for demining tasks, as pro-
ductivity and cost effectiveness are areas that require further study in 
the whole mine action sector. The use of visiting military forces on the 
other hand, has been found to be most effective in the emergency or 
starr-up phase of a national mine action programme. 
Wherever there is a mine or UXO problem, humanitarian 
and developmental ini tiatives necessarily involve a high degree of con-
tact and interaction among military personnel, non-military mine 
action personnel and local communities. Militaty capabilities, if prop-
erly directed and controlled, can bring important skills and organiza-
tional assets to complement many mine action activities, particularly 
in the emergency or srarr-up phase of a programme. Military organi-
zations are normally trained to be mission-oriented and to complete 
these missions as quickly and efficiently as possible. This works well 
for almost all military problems, and indeed for many humanitarian 
problems like infrastructure repair, bm establishing national mine 
acrion programmes under post-conAict conditions normally requires a 
longer-term approach than a militaty "task-oriented" one. Military 
actors are unlikely to have the best idea how mine clearance firs into 
the larger mine action picture. 
The component activities of mine action have to be closely 
coordinated if they are to work at all and military staff are well-versed 
in the concept of how many interlocking compo nents make up a plan. 
Mine action plans require a similar degree of integration, bm this 
planning has to take place with a number of different agencies, both 
military and non-military, which often have different perspectives and 
agendas. All the actors must be prepared to submit to overall coordi-
nation and direction. T his does nor mean interfering in the established 
military "chain of command," but that rhe broader issues like nation-
al strategies and prioriry setting for all the aspects of mine action are 
-
developed in a consultative manner with the full range of actors. 
* Copies of the study, The Role of the Military in Mine 
Action, are available in hardcopy from the GlCHD or can be down-
loaded form the GICHD website at www.gichd.ch. 
* Photo c/o AP. 
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HDTC, continued from page II 
of epidemiology and public health methods of assessment to analyze 
and present clara used for planning and monitoring. Additionally, the 
HDTC hosted representatives from the Psychological Operations unit 
to discuss specific needs and recommendations. This interactive 
course developmenr process allowed the center to update and imple-
ment changes for subsequent classes. 
New Plans for Training 
The HDTC is planning to add rwo additional trammg 
modules ro its curriculum. The first is a Level I UXO C learance 
course that will enhance training of technicians ro perform barrie area 
clearance (BAC) in contaminated areas. Students attending this course 
will graduate with specialized knowledge gained from hands-on train-
ing and mission-specific lesson material in-hand for use in teaching 
students in the specific host nation. 
The second new training module pertains to an 
information database manager's course on the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), the Geneva 
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (G ICHD) 
standardized mine action database. The HDTC responded ro requests 
from its "cusromers" to add this module to our curriculum and 
already uses a version of 1M SMA that incorporates digitized maps of 
the local training area at Fort Leonard Wood. This allows srudenrs to 
work with actual survey data collected from simulated hazard areas and 
incorporate them into IMSMA. 
Final Comments 
Landmine clearance is a deadly serious business. With rhis 
ever in mind, rhe HDTC staff works diligently to conduct all training 
in accordance with IMAS and to find and teach safer ways to perform 
HMA operations, thereby fully supporting rhe U.S. government's 
Mine Action Program. 
*Graphics c/o the author. 
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U.S. Department of Defense 
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